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INTRODUCTION
U.S. regulations on the export of encryption technology ("crypto")
raise numerous complex issues with technical, political, legal, and eco-
nomic dimensions. The main argument for regulating and restricting the
export of encryption is that the abuse of this technology by terrorists and
criminals would severely impede the ability of national security and law
enforcement officials to carry out their functions.' The software and
high-tech industries, on the other hand, argue that current export regula-
tions put U.S. encryption businesses at a competitive disadvantage rela-
tive to foreign companies, and that such regulations violate their First
Amendment free speech rights. 2 Privacy advocates, who are on the same
side of the debate as the high-tech industries, argue that any restrictions
on the accessibility of encryption products infringe on the individual's
right to informational privacy, thus implicating the Fourth Amendment. 3
The government does not deny the importance of strong encryption
to U.S. companies and private citizens alike. 4 Encryption products
both serve to protect proprietary data of U.S. companies
worldwide and have the potential to be an economic
boom in the cryptography software market .. . . [T]he
problem is reconciling all of these competing interests
and sorting out the extremes, which are numerous, but
without compromising any one interest too much.5
In order for the U.S. government to reach this middle ground, it must
strike a balance between America's national security interests on one
hand, and commercial and privacy interests on the other: "The govern-
ment must meet the responsibility of enhancing public safety and na-
tional security, but the requirements that it imposes should not be so
I See FBI, ENCRYPTION: IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT (June 3, 1999) at I [hereinafter
FBI REPORTI (stating that "It he law enforcement community ... is extremely concerned about
the serious threat posed by the proliferation and use of robust encryption products that do not
allow for the immediate, lawful access to the plaintext of encrypted, criminally related com-
munications ....").
2 See Jeri Clausing, Concerns Raised Over Encryption Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1999, at C5.
3 See generallv Americans jor Computer Privacy [hereinafter ACPI at http://
www.computerprivacy.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
4 See FBI REPORT, supra note 1.
5 J. Tenence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of Strong Crypto
and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 321 (1998).
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burdensome as to hinder the development of products that incorporate
encryption technology." '6 To this end, this note proposes that the U.S.
government continue with its current trend of easing export restrictions
on encryption technology, and in place of licensing restrictions introduce
a less burdensome "encryption export tax." The revenue from this tax
would then be used to fund a joint and centralized effort by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 7 and the National Security Agency
("NSA")" to research and develop advanced decryption technologies and
tools.
The first section of this note introduces the basics of encryption and
defines the commonly used terms within the field of cryptography. The
next section outlines the current regulations and agreements, both at the
domestic and international levels, as well as pending proposals to amend
U.S. regulation of encryption exports. This note then provides a histori-
cal overview of the development of encryption technology, as well as the
governmental policies and regulations regarding this technology. Next,
this note will delve into the constitutional issues at the heart of govern-
mental regulation of encryption technology. This note then analyzes the
arguments for protecting national security interests through the regula-
tion of encryption exports, as well as the arguments for liberalizing such
regulations. Finally, this note proposes implementing an "encryption ex-
port tax" to fund governmental counter-encryption research and develop-
ment in lieu of regulating of encryption exports.
I. ENCRYPTION BASICS AND TERMINOLOGY
Cryptography is the art of using code to keep information secret. 9
Enctyption is a technique or process for encoding or scrambling commu-
nications so that information exchanged between two or more parties is
kept confidential and does not, in the course of communication, become
known to anyone other than the sender and the receiver.' The unen-
crypted information is referred to as plaintext, whereas the encrypted
version of this same information is known as ciphertext.1' Dectyption is
6 Christian White, Decrypting the Politics: Why the Clinton Administration's National
Cryptography PolicY Will Continue to be Dictated by National Economic Interest, 7 COM-
MLAW CONSPECTUS 193, 202 (1999).
7 The FBI, established in 1908, is responsible for "investigating all violations of federal
laws with the exception of those which have been assigned by legislative enactment or other-
wise to some other Federal agency." BLACK'S LAW DIC'IONARY 625 (70' ed. 1999).
8 The NSA, established in 1952, is a division of the Department of Defense. STEWARD
A. BAKER & PAUL R. HURST, THE LIMITS OF TRUST: CRYPOGRAPHY, GOVERNMENTS, AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 24 (1998).
9 See Stender, supra note 5, at 293-94.
H) See id. at 294.
II Id.
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the process of converting ciphertext back into plaintext.12 Cryptographic
systems generally utilize a crvptologic algorithm, "a set of rules or series
of mathematical steps," in conjunction with a key.' 3 The key is usually a
string of bits and is functionally analogous to a key that unlocks a door -
it "unlocks" or decrypts the message so that the intended recipient can
read it.'1
There are two main types of key-based algorithms: secret-key (sym-
metric) and public-key (asymmetric).' 5 In secret-key cryptographic sys-
tems, both the encryption key and decryption key are the same so that
everyone who needs to decrypt the message must have the key distrib-
uted to them.' 6 The inherent weakness in a secret-key system is "the
problem of finding a trusted method to distribute the key, and moreover,
protecting the key while in custody."' 7 This type of scheme, however, is
not practical for widespread commercial or personal use.',
In public-key cryptographic systems, the key used for encryption is
different from the key used for decryption. 19 Consequently, this type of
system "allows users to openly publish one key in the phone-book like
directory (the 'public key'), while keeping the other key private (the 'pri-
vate key'). '2 ' Public-key encryption "allows parties to exchange en-
crypted messages by using and revealing only their public keys, without
ever having to exchange private keys." '2 1 As long as the recipient him-
self keeps secret the private key that matches the public key, only he can
read messages encrypted with the public key." 22
II. CURRENT REGULATIONS, PROPOSALS, AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. EXPORT REGULATIONS
Currently, all exports from the United States are regulated under
either the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") 23 or the Export Adminis-
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See BAKER & HURST, supra note 8, at 4.
15 See Stender, supra note 5, at 295.
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 This is because where there is no secure channel for exchanging the secret keys. Thus,
the key exchange is subject to easy interception. See Ira S. Rubenstein, E.xport Controls on
Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1994, at 183 (PLI Corn. L. &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A-705, 1994).
19 See Stender, stqra note 5, at 296.
20 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 183.
21 Stender, suqra note 5, at 296.
22 .BAKER & HURST, supra note 8, at 2.
23 22 U.S.C. §§ 2571-2794 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
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tration Act ("EAA").24 The AECA confers on the State Department the
authority to regulate the export of anything it deems to be a munition,
which it defines as "a weapon of war."'2 5 Items classified as munitions
require individually approved export licenses which designate the cus-
tomer, the application, and conditions for the handling or redeployment
of the item. 26 If the State Department decides that an item is dual-use, a
category that includes commercial products with military applications, it
transfers jurisdiction over the item's export to the Department of Com-
merce ("DOC").27 The DOC, under the EAA, now regulates the export
of all encryption devices and software, except for those that are specifi-
cally designed or modified for military use.2 8
The DOC's Export Administration Regulations ("EAR")2 9 define
export as "an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the
EAR out of the United States, or release of technology or software sub-
ject to the EAR to a foreign national in the United States. ' 31 The EAR
additionally define "exportation of encryption source code and object
code ' 3' as "[d]ownloading, or causing the downloading of, such software
to locations ... outside the U.S., or making such software available for
transfer outside the U.S., . . . including transfers from electronic bulletin
boards, Internet file transfer protocol and World Wide Web sites." 32
The Clinton administration initially instituted a restrictive encryp-
tion export policy over the objection of encryption software developers,
who argued that such restraints would place an unnecessary burden on
their ability to compete in the international encryption market.3 3 How-
ever, on September 16, 1999, the Clinton administration announced that
24 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
25 Id.
26 See BAKER & HURST, supra note 8, at 106.
27 /d. Prior to December 30, 1996, the State Department was responsible for regulating
the export of most encryption products from the United States under the AECA and the Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"). Id. at 23. Jurisdiction over commercial en-
cryption products was officially transferred from the State Department to the Commerce
pursuant to Executive Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996). Id.
28 Id. at 24. Other agencies, including the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense,
also have a say in decisions concerning commercial encryption exports. Id. The NSA, a divi-
sion of the Department of Defense, has the most expertise in encryption matters. Id. Conse-
quently, other agencies have usually deferred to the agency of the NSA on encryption export
decisions. Id.
29 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774 (2000).
30 Id. § 734.2(b)(I) (2000).
31 Source code refers to the text of a computer program written in a high-level program-
ming language, such as C or Pascal. A computer cannot make use of source code until its has
been translated into a lower-level, machine language, known as object code.
32 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii) (2000).
33 See Mai-Tram B. Dinh, The U.S. Encrvption Export Policy: Taking the Byte Out of the
Debate, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 375, 375 (1998) (The U.S. government has traditionally
imposed restrictions on the export of encryption software in order to protect national security.).
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the licensing requirements implemented by the Bureau of Export Admin-
istration ("BXA") 3 1 two years earlier would be changed so that the gov-
ernment allowed, after a one-time review, the marketing and export of
56-bit encryption technology, as opposed to the prior limit of 40-bit tech-
nology.3 5 Moreover, the Administration eliminated the requirement that
these software companies create and implement a key recovery system.36
The Administration also directed "all executive departments and agen-
cies to promote efforts domestically and internationally to make the In-
temet a secure environment for commerce. '37 The apparent rationale for
this policy is that "encryption policy should align itself with market
forces," because the mass use of encryption technology in the area of
Internet technology is in the national interest.38
34 The Bureau of Export Administration ("BXA"), a division of the Department of Com-
merce, has regulatory jurisdiction over encryption items and activities that are subject to the
EAR. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(a)(1). A BXA license or license exception is required for exports to
all destinations, except Canada, for items controlled under Export Control Classification Num-
bers (ECCNs) which are designated as "encryption items." Id. pt. 774, Supp. No. 1. Such
encryption items include "all encryption commodities, software, and technology that contain
encryption features and are subject to the EAR." Id. § 772.1. Encryption software includes
"computer programs that provide capability of encryption functions or confidentiality of infor-
mation or information systems," which includes "source code, object code, application
software, or systems software." Id.
35 See White, supra note 6, at 201-01. On September 16, 1999, President Clinton sub-
mitted to Congress a very general proposal entitled the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of
1999 ("CESA"), which would purportedly "protect the growing use of encryption for the legit-
imate protection of privacy and confidentiality by businesses and individuals, while helping
law enforcement obtain evidence to investigate and prosecute criminals despite their use of
encryption to hide criminal activity." Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secre-
tary, Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999, Sept. 16, 1999) [hereinafter CESA1, availa-
ble at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/CESA/CESA revfactsheet2.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2000).
CESA would allow law enforcement to maintain its ability to access decryption keys stored
with trusted third parties, who protect such information from inappropriate release. Id. In
addition, CESA would authorize "$80 million over four years for the FBI's Technical Support
Center to serve as a centralized resource for Federal, State, and local law enforcement in
responding to the increasing use of encryption by criminals." Id. CESA would not regulate
the domestic development, use or sale of encryption, and Americans will remain free to use
any encryption system domestically. /d. Under CESA, individuals would remain completely
free not to use the services of a recovery agent. Id. CESA, however, remained noticeably
silent regarding the exportation of encryption, so it was unclear whether "individuals" would
include users of exported encryption \in addition to domestic users.
36 See White, supra note 6, at 201.
37 Id. at 202.
38 See id.; see also Dinh, supra note 33, at 391 (explaining that, at an industry confer-
ence on the future of information technology, panelists representing the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the National Computer Security Association agreed that "the success of e-
commerce depends on consumers' confidence in the system and their belief that transactions
are safe from meddlers"). However, critics of these amended export regulations pointed out
that, given the wide availability of stronger 64 to 128-bit encryption products, foreign custom-
ers would reject American "encryption lite" products. See ACP, supra note 3. According to
banking and computer executives, "40-bit codes are no longer safe and can be cracked in as
little as a few hours by skilled computer hackers. The minimum acceptable code, according to
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On January 14, 2000 the Clinton administration formally liberalized
its licensing requirements on the export of encryption software prod-
ucts. 39 The new regulations 41 "allow United States companies to ship
any retail encryption4 ' products around the world to commercial con-
cerns, individuals and other nongoverment users after a one-time tech-
nical review by an interagency panel."'42 In addition, the rules allow the
export, without licenses, of most types of source code (the computer
code used to create programs). 43 The only exceptions to these rules
would be to nations on the State Department's list of seven terrorist sup-
porting countries, which are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria. 44
The new regulations amend the EAR to allow export of any encryp-
tion software or commodity to individuals, commercial firms, and other
non-governmental end-users in all destinations, while more liberally al-
lowing exports of retail encryption commodities and software to all end-
users in all destinations. 45 In essence, the amended regulations imple-
ment the encryption policy announced by the White House on September
16, 1999, which rested on three principles: (1) technical review of en-
cryption products in advance of sale, (2) a streamlined post-export re-
porting system, and (3) a process that permits the government to review
export of strong encryption to foreign governments. 46  Cisco Systems,
one of the largest producers of routers that form the backbone of the
Internet, expressed modest enthusiasm for the new rules. 47 While Cisco
many bank executives, must have keys that are 128-bits long." Edmund Andrews, U.S. Re-
strictions on Evports Aid German Software Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at D1.
39 See David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on Encrvjnion, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at Cl.
40 The new regulations essentially eliminate licensing requirements for strong encryp-
tion. But most products will still be subject to a one-time government review and companies
are supposed to track and report their sales. Id.
41 Retail encryption commodities and software are "those which are widely available and
can be exported and re-exported to any end-user (including any Internet and telecommunica-
tions service provider) to provide products and services (e.g. e-commerce, client-server appli-
cations, or software subscriptions) to any end-user." Revisions to Encryption Items, 65 Fed.
Reg. 2493 (2000) (interim final rule at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, et al.) Ihereinafter Encryption
ltems]. The criteria for determining whether something qualifies as a retail product includes
functionality, sales volume, distributions methods, ability to modify products and
requirements for substantial support by the supplier . . . . Finance-specific, 56-bit
non-mass market products with a key exchange greater than 512 bits and up to 1024
bits, network-based applications and other products which are functionally
equivalent to retail products are considered retail products.
Id.
42 Sanger & Clausing, supra note 39, at Cl.
43 Id.
44 Id.; see also Encryption Items, stilwa note 41, at 2492.
45 See Encryption Items, supra note 41, at 2492.
46 hi.
47 See Sanger & Clausing, supra note 39, at Cl.
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and numerous other high-tech companies viewed the new regulations as
a step in the right direction and "as delivering on Vice President Al
Gore's promises to eliminate cumbersome licensing rules on exporting
software, civil libertarians say they fail to fix the constitutional questions
at the heart of pending court cases." '48
B. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There have been three bills relating to the issue of encryption intro-
duced during the 106"' Congress, but only two of the bills specifically
propose amendments to government regulation of encryption exports. 49
The Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act ("SAFE"),5) pro-
poses a less restrictive approach to export regulations that would allow
U.S. companies to export strong encryption products if comparable prod-
ucts were already available overseas. 5' SAFE would remove existing
export controls on hardware and software encryption products that are of
comparable strength to those that are commercially available from a for-
eign supplier, regardless of any adverse impact on national security.5 2
SAFE would also place a prohibition on any type of mandatory key re-
covery encryption by the government, but includes a provision that might
make it criminal to use encryption in furtherance of a criminal act. - 3 At
the time of this bill's introduction, it enjoyed over 200 bipartisan co-
sponsors. 54 The number of co-sponsors has grown to over 250 since that
time.5 - As of late July 1999, the House Rules Committee was preparing
to decide which version of SAFE should be sent to the House for a floor
vote.56
The other congressional bill that addresses encryption export regula-
tions is S.798, entitled the Promote Reliable On-Line Transactions to En-
courage Commerce and Trade Act of 1999 ("PROTECT"), introduced by
48 Id.
49 FBI REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-13. The Electronic Rights (E-Rights) for the 21'
Century Act (S.854), introduced Senator Leahy (D-VT) on April 21, 1999, proposes to "pro-
tect the privacy and constitutional rights of Americans, to establish standards and procedures
regarding law enforcement access to location information .... to affirm the rights of Ameri-
cans to use and sell encryption as a tool for protecting their online privacy ... ." Id.
5() H.R. 850, 1061h Cong. (1999). This bill was introduced Representative Robert Good-
latte (R-VA) on February 25, 1999. See FBI REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
5' The computer industry, seeking an open world market for its encryption products, has
long complained that such export restrictions are pointless because terrorists can simply buy
powerful encryption products from other countries, such as Canada, Israel, or Ireland. See
Demos to Prez: 'Use SAFE Text,' at http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/
21744.html (last visited March 17, 2001).
52 See FBI REPORT, supra note I, at 11.
53 See id.
54 See id.
5 See id.
56 See id.
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Senator John McCain (R-AZ) on April 14, 1999. 5 7 This bill calls for the
relaxation of encryption export controls for certain sectors and "responsi-
ble" governments, while at the same time maintaining national security
interests. 58 Under PROTECT, responsible governments include those of
member nations of NATO, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 59 PRO-
TECT would also create an Encryption Export Advisory Board which
would be responsible for keeping the Secretary of Commerce abreast on
the latest encryption products that are available or will be available
within twelve months from a foreign supplier. 611 This bill addresses
NSA's concerns by including a provision that allows the President to
override any decision by the Encryption Export Advisory Board for na-
tional security purposes. 6 1 PROTECT would also maintain presidential
authority to prohibit the export of encryption products to countries that
support terrorism or otherwise pose a threat to national security. 62
C. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The Wassenaar Arrangement, which "was set up as a multilateral
export-control group that was designed to promote communication and
cooperation in controlling dual-use goods, including cryptography," un-
derwent a major change on December 3, 1998.63 The thirty-three coun-
tries that subscribe to this Arrangement agreed "(1) to impose export
controls on encryption software using keys above 64-bits in length, and
(2) to eliminate record keeping for low-level encryption. '64 This agree-
ment, however, does not level the playing field of the global encryption
market because many countries, including Israel, South Africa, India,
and China are not Wassenaar members. 65 Additionally, "while [this]
agreement suggests a ceiling, it does not prevent member-countries from
imposing stricter controls on encryption exports, as the United States has
done."' 66 The Clinton administration cited the amended Wassenaar con-
57 See id. at 12-13 (PROTECT is a pro-industry bill even though its stated purpose is "to
promote electronic commerce by encouraging and facilitating the use of encryption in inter-
state commerce consistent with the protections of national security and other purposes.").
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
6t See id.
62 See id.
63 Staci 1. Levin, Who Are We Protecting? A Critical Evaluation of United States En-
crvption Technology Export Controls, 30 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 529, 537 (1999).
64 h(.
65 Id.
66 Id.: see also F. Lynn McNulty, Encryption's Importance to Economic Infiastructure
Securit,, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 427, 435 (1999). The article states:
The Wassanaar countries extended the group's Dual-Use Control List to encryption
hardware and software cryptography products above 56-bits, which include web
2000]
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trols to support its efforts to extend its levels of control on the export of
cryptography. 67
Prior to the January 14, 2000 amendment to the encryption export
regulations, the American Electronics Association ("AEA"), an industry
group representing 3,000 plus U.S.-based technology companies, sup-
ported "the Clinton administration's decision to align the U.S. export
regulations with the new Wassenaar requirements and to deregulate
products up to 56-bits, but [felt] the response [was] inadequate. '68 The
AEA pointed out the folly of arbitrary line drawing since law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies find it no more difficult to break 65-bit
than 64-bit encryption.69 Critics suggested that the government recon-
sider whether its export policy can actually achieve its stated goals
before trying to appease both the software industry and law enforcement
officials by merely tinkering with the numbers and details.7"I The fact
that the most recent encryption regulations impose no encryption key
length limit for retail encryption products suggests that these critics' sug-
gestions did not fall on deaf ears.7'
III. EVOLUTION OF ENCRYPTION POLICY
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In assessing the arguments for and against the widespread availabil-
ity of cryptography that would result from unregulated export, it helps to
examine the development and application of cryptography. World War I
was the first war to be fought in the era of radio, which made it possible
to transmit and receive human voices over long distances. 72 The solution
to the ubiquitous nature of radio reception, which enabled anybody with
the right equipment and know-how to listen in, was cryptography. After
WWI, the United States continued to develop its capacity for signals in-
telligence and merged this responsibility with the development of codes
to protect U.S. military communications. 73 World War II was a triumph
for American communications intelligence, which made important con-
browsers, e-mail applications, electronic commerce servers, and telephone scram-
bling devices .... IMember countriesl also re-imposed controls on other mass-
market products with strengths over 64-bits, such as personal computer operating
systems, word processing, and data base programs.
Id.
67 See McNulty, supra note 66, at 436.
68 Id. at 436-37.
69 See id. at 437.
70 See 144 Cong. Rec. S12,151 at 12,152 (Oct. 9, 1998).
71 See Encryption Items, supra note 41, at 2492.
72 See WHITFIELD DIMFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 49 (1998).
73 See id. at 52.
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tributions to victories in both the Atlantic and Pacific:74 "The Allies'
ability to understand German and Japanese communications, even when
they were encoded with the enemies' best cryptographic systems, is
widely seen as having been crucial to the course of World War 11." 75
In 1952, President Harry Truman signed a secret presidential order
creating the National Security Agency ("NSA"), whose objective was to
"capture control of all cryptographic and cryptanalytic work within the
United States." '76 During the 1970s, the NSA recognized that implemen-
tation of federal laws like the Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act
of 1974,77 combined with the increasing use of computers and digital
communications by the federal government, would require that it share
its cryptographic equipment with a wider range of government users. 78
Any cryptographic equipment that was to be put in the hands of users
who did not undergo security clearance would have to utilize unclassified
cryptographic algorithms. 79 The NSA feared that making any of its algo-
rithms public would reveal information about its design philosophy and
approach, which could conceivably compromise its other equipment.,,,
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the NSA took notice of increased civil-
ian research in cryptography and tried unsuccessfully to limit civilian
development and application of this technology."' In the early 1990s, the
FBI "formulated a policy that included shoring up its ability to perform
electronic surveillance .... and preventing the establishment of unbreak-
able cryptography in the public sector."' 2 The FBI's initial efforts in
support of this policy were embodied in the concept known as key
escrow.
B. THE RISE AND FALL OF KEY ESCROW?
Key escrow, later euphemistically renamed key recovery and key
management in order to appease the fears of privacy advocates, is a sys-
tem by which users of cryptographic equipment are able to protect their
privacy against most intruders while allowing the government to keep a
set of "spare keys" with which it can decipher and read the communica-
74 See id. at 53.
75 Id. at 6. During WWI and WWII the U.S. primarily implemented mechanical crypto-
graphic systems, devices utilizing physical moving parts rather than electronic and magnetic
components. See id. at 19-29. Since the 1940s, the U.S. has converted to purely electronic
encryption. See id.
76 Id. at 55.
77 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
78 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 72, at 59.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 60-76.
82 Id. at 76.
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tions.8 3 Under this system, encryption keys are kept "in escrow" by a
trusted third party.8 4 These keys can only be released to "authorized par-
ties, either predetermined or by court order."8' 5 The FBI claims that the
use of trusted third parties to hold keys in escrow would have the benefit
of providing assurance to "commercial and individual users of encryp-
tion that their encrypted communications and electronically stored infor-
mation are secure against unauthorized disclosure and illegal 'hacker-
type' attacks." '86
The first proposed key escrow scheme, made public on April 16,
1993, was the Clipper Chip program, which allowed government offi-
cials to decipher messages for law enforcement and national security pur-
poses.8 7 Encryption businesses objected to the Clipper Chip program on
the grounds that the added manufacturing costs, which would ultimately
be passed on to the customer, combined with the existence of a "back
door" made it unlikely that Clipper Chip products would appeal to for-
eign customers. 8 Critics of key recovery systems point out that "knowl-
edge that the government has the technical ability to read all
communications creates a perception that no communication is private,
even if' the vast majority of communications are never intercepted or
read."8' 9 Americans for Computer Privacy ("ACP"), a broad-based coali-
tion which primarily represents financial services, manufacturing, tele-
communications, and high-tech groups, points out that the
implementation of a mandatory key recovery system would have the ef-
fect of giving the FBI "immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted
communications or electronic communication without the knowledge or
cooperation of the person using such product or service." 9 1
Despite industry-wide opposition to any sort of key recovery
scheme, this type of system, currently referred to as Key Management
Infrastructure ("KMI"), continued to exist within the Clinton administra-
tion's encryption export regulations. 9' However, this type of regulatory
system seems to have lost any bite that it might have had as the Com-
merce Department has continued to issue an increasing number of license
exceptions allowing merchants to export strong encryption after a one-
83 Id. at 7.
84 See Stender, supra note 5, at 298.
85 1/d.
86 FBI REPORT, supra note I, at 9.
87 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 72, at 7.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 212 (emphasis added).
90 ACP, supra note 3, at http://www.computerprivacy.org/myths/ (last visited September
28, 2000).
91 See generally Key Management Infrastructure (KMI), 15 C.F.R. § 740.8 (2000).
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time technical review.92 For example, under Encryption Licensing Ar-
rangements ("ELAs"), distributors can export encryption goods "as long
as they comply with restrictions contained in the ELA."'9 3 It appears that
ELAs will vary on a case-by-case technical review basis, which suggests
that there is no longer a uniform mandate requiring all encryption export-
ers to participate in any key recovery system.
IV. REGULATION OF ENCRYPTION EXPORTS PASSES
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
A. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
In assessing whether governmental regulation of the export of en-
cryption software raises First Amendment concerns, it is necessary to
address two sub-issues. The first sub-issue is whether encryption
software source code qualifies as "speech" for First Amendment pur-
poses. 94 The second sub-issue is whether current U.S. export regulations
are a prior restraint on speech. 95
Of the two cases that have addressed the issue of whether source
code is "speech," Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of Justice ("Bernstein II"),96
has received the most extensive judicial review. The three-judge panel
of the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 in May 1999 that encryption program
source codes contain expressions of ideas that cannot be suppressed by
government officials. 97  Bernstein, a mathematics professor, sought to
export to the international academic and scientific communities an en-
cryption method, which he had developed during his days as a graduate
92 Id. See also Christopher R. Wall & Thomas M. DeButts, Encrption Export Controls,
il COPING WITH U.S. ExPORT CONTROLS 1999 at 549, 551 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. AO-002Q, 1999). Certain "encryption items," as defined in EAR, 15
C.F.R. pt. 772, may be exported under License Exception KMI (15 C.F.R § 740.8) after a one-
time technical review by BXA. Id. Commodities and software eligible for the this License
Exception KMI include "those for which companies had developed schemes for U.S. Govern-
ment key recovery or deposit of keys with a key escrow agent under earlier encryption export
control regimes. Id. However, recoverable commodities and software, as defined in EAR, 15
C.F.R. pt. 772, may also be exported pursuant to an encryption licensing arrangement ("ELA")
when License Exception KMI cannot be used. 15 C.F.R. §§ 742.15(b)(2), 740.8. The effect
of these licensing exceptions is to allow encryption commodities and software of any key
length to be exported under a license exception to non-government end users in any country,
except one of the seven designated terrorist countries. Wall & DeButts, supra. In addition,
retail encryption commodities and software of any key length may be exported under a license
exception to any country except the seven designated terrorist countries after a one-time tech-
nical review. Id.
93 Encryption Items, sulpra note 41, at 2492.
9, See generally U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
95 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9'h Circ. 1999) lhereinaf-
ter Bernstein 1111 (pointing out that "any prior restraint on expression comes ... with a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity").
96 Id.
97 Id.
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student. 98 The State Department classified the software, which utilized
his encryption scheme, as a munition and told Bernstein that he would
need a license to export the computer program. 99 In granting summary
judgment for Bernstein, the district court found that the program's source
code to be "speech" protected by the First Amendment. " "'
In December 1996, President Clinton shifted licensing authority for
nonmilitary encryption commodities and technologies from the State De-
partment to the Department of Commerce, which promulgated the EAR
to govem the export of crypto.11' Bernstein amended his complaint by
adding the Department of Commerce as a defendant and advanced the
same constitutional objections."12 The district court again granted sum-
mary judgment for Bernstein, finding the EAR to be facially invalid as a
prior restraint on speech. 03
In affirming Bernstein I and /, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that cryp-
tographers use source code to express their scientific ideas in the same
way that mathematicians use equations or economists use graphs to ex-
press their findings or ideas.(N The court seemed to emphasize the fact
that source code, " -' unlike object code, 06 "is not meant solely for the
computer, but is rather written in a language intended also for human
analysis and understanding." 117 The circuit court's emphasis on the dis-
tinction between object code and source code is overly simplistic because
source code is not necessarily intended for others to analyze or under-
stand. Programmers who intend their source code to be understood by
others usually include annotations and remarks throughout the program,
whereas programmers who are more interested in the functionality or
efficiency of their source code will be less inclined to include such de-
scriptive annotations.
According to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States, the dispositive factor in determining "speech" for First
98 Bernstein argued he wanted to export his encryption methods for purely academic
rather than commercial purposes. See id. at 1136. Bernstein's motive exporting encryption,
however, is not dispositive on the issue of whether or not encryption software source code
qualifies as "speech" under the First Amendment.
99 Id. at 1136.
1)( See Bemstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 922 F.Supp. 1426, 1434-36 (N.D. Cal 1996)
I hereinafter Bernstein l.
il See Bernstein III, 176 F.3d. at 1136.
i02 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 1141.
i05 Source code refers to "text of a program written in a 'high-level' programming lan-
guage, such as 'PASCAL' or 'C.'" /d. at 1140.
i06 Object code refers to "lower-level" or "machine" language, which gives instruction to
the computer. See id.
107 Id. at 1142.
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Amendment purposes is whether it expresses ideas. 8 However, the Su-
preme Court has also pointed out that merely because something is occa-
sionally expressive does not guarantee that the protections of the First
Amendment extend to it."19 In Bernstein III, the Ninth Circuit suggested
that Bernstein's encryption method was intended, in part, as political ex-
pression of Bernstein's disagreement with US encryption exports regula-
tions. 'I The assertion that this encryption program is political speech
begs the question of who Bernstein's intended audience is. His audience,
if it exists at all, would be limited to computer programmers who happen
to be sifting through lines of code in search of a political message. This
is not a common activity among programmers and people in general.
As Judge Nelson's dissenting opinion in Bernstein III pointed out,
"while encryption source code may occasionally be used in an expressive
manner, it is inherently a functional device."'''I The function of encryp-
tion source code is to render computer communication and transactions
secret, thereby creating "a lockbox of sorts around a message that can
only be unlocked by someone with a key."'"12 The dissent also pointed
out that "[i]t is the function or task encryption source code performs
which creates its value in most cases. This functional aspect of encryp-
tion source code contains no expression ...."1 13 While encryption
methods may be the subject of political or nonpolitical speech, it makes
little sense to suggest that encryption source code qualifies as speech in
and of itself. On September 30, 1999 the full court of the Ninth Circuit
announced that a majority of its active judges had voted to grant the
government's request for a rehearing, en banc, but no date has been set.
In so doing, the court withdrew its Bernstein III decision.' 14
Junger v. Dale),' 15 the other case which specifically addressed the
issue of whether or not encryption source code should be considered
"speech," held that encryption software source code is not sufficiently
108 See Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
109 See City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 12, 25 (1989) ("It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity - for example, walking down the street or meet-
ing one's friends at the shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment.").
I1  Bernstein 11, 176 F.3d. at 1141 n.14.
If Id. at 1148 (emphasis added).
112 Id.
'13 Id.
14 192 F.3d 1308 (9"' Circ. 1999).
'15 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998). Junger, a law professor at Case
Western Reserve University who wished to post encryption programs on his web site, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of export regulations that prevented him from engaging in such
activity. The court held that export of encryption software source code was not sufficiently
expressive to receive First Amendment protection, and that export regulations requiring licens-
ing of such software did not qualify as unconstitutional prior restraint.
20001
176 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:161
expressive to merit First Amendment protection.' 16 The district court
reasoned that "speech" is protected not simply because it is written in a
language but rather because it expresses ideas.' 17 Encryption source
code is rarely expressive, and in the limited instances it may communi-
cate some idea, it is unintelligible to most people. That exporting source
code may occasionally be expressive "does not necessarily extend First
Amendment protection to it."'" '
According to Karn v. U.S. Department of State, even if one were to
assume that encryption software source code qualifies as speech, export
regulation of this software does not necessarily constitute a prior restraint
on speech.' 19 In order for an export licensing law to be invalidated by a
prior restraint facial challenge, it "must have a close enough nexus to
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose
a real and substantial threat of . . . censorship risks."121) If the export
regulations are content-neutral' 2' and aimed at preventing software ex-
porters from making it easier for foreign intelligence sources to encrypt
their communications, the government may justify such regulation if it:
(i) is within the constitutional power of government, (2) furthers an im-
portant or substantial government interest, and (3) is narrowly tailored to
the governmental interest. 122 Both the Junger and Karn courts applied
this three-part test and concluded that U.S. export regulations were not a
prior restraint on speech. As the Junger and Karn decisions and Judge
Nelson's dissenting opinion in Bernstein III suggest, the First Amend-
ment analysis weighs in favor of regulating the export of encryption
software because its source code lacks substantial expressive value, and
thus is not "speech" for First Amendment purposes.
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The notion of informational privacy is implicit in the Fourth
Amendment, which asserts "the right of the people to be secure in their
116 Id.
117 Id. at 717.
118 Id.: see also City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 12, 25 (1989).
119 See Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F.Supp. I (D.C. 1996) (holding that designation
of the disk containing the encryption source codes as a "defense article" was not subject to
judicial review: that export regulations did not violate Kam's First Amendment rights; and that
export restrictions did not violate due process). This decision has subsequently been remanded
to the district court to consider the constitutional effect of the transfer of jurisdiction of export
controls from the State Department to the Commerce Department. See 107 F.3d 923 (D.C.
Circ. 1997). However, it is unlikely that the First Amendment holding will be altered as a
result of the change in governmental jurisdiction.
120 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 751), 759 (1988).
121 Content neutral regulations do not take into consideration what is expressed by the
content of the regulated article or good. See id.
122 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the government's prohi-
bition against burning draft cards and establishing the elements of prior restraint test).
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persons, houses, papers, and effects."' 23 Certain lobbying groups, such
as Americans for Computer Privacy, favor lifting all controls on the ex-
port of encryption on the basis that government regulations and restric-
tions on encryption software will compromise the ability of individuals
to secure the privacy of their e-mail.' 24 Proponents for reducing encryp-
tion export restrictions also argue that the spread of stronger encryption
tools will encourage worldwide adoption of more secure standards for
ensuring privacy of communications. For example, businesses and their
customers would have less fear that their credit card numbers or other
private communications would be intercepted by third parties over the
Internet. These privacy concerns, however, do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment unless: (1) the consumer or end-user of the exported
software has standing to bring suit against the United States for violating
her Fourth Amendment privacy protections, and (2) the export regula-
tions violate the consumer's reasonable expectation of privacy. 25
The end-user of exported U.S. encryption goods will usually be an
alien on foreign soil. 126 The Bill of Rights provisions of the U.S. Consti-
tution, however, do not always extend to aliens, particularly when they
are on foreign soil. The Fourth Amendment, for example, does not apply
to searches or seizures conducted on foreign soil, even if the search in-
volves agents of the U.S. government.' 27 In other words, evidence ob-
tained by foreign or U.S. officials from searches conducted in a foreign
country is admissible in U.S. federal courts regardless of whether the
search complied with the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
was not "understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activi-
ties of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in
international waters."12
In the case of encryption export regulations, one might make the
argument that violation of an end-user's expectation of privacy is vio-
lated within the U.S., in which case an alien end-user might have stand-
ing to bring suit against the U.S. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly where
violation of the end-user's expectation of privacy occurs, assuming that
123 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that
citizens are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy).
124 See Jeri Clausing, Concerns Raised Over Encrvption Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1999, at C5.
125 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (adopting a sliding-scale reasonableness test for
the individual's expectation of privacy).
126 An alien within the U.S. who wants to purchase encryption goods is not subject to
EAR. See Encryption Items, supra note 41. Similarly, U.S. citizens and business wanting to
use U.S. encryption devices are generally not subject to EAR. Id.
127 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990): United States v. Behety,
32 F.3d 503, 510 (11 " Cir. 1994); United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 n.8 (5 h Cir.
1993).
128 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 267.
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there was indeed a violation of the end-user's reasonable expectation of
privacy. However, the question of the territorial or geographic point at
which the end-user's expectation of privacy was breached bears on the
more general issue of whether this end-user would have standing to bring
suit against the U.S. As the following analysis shows, even if the end-
user or consumer of exported encryption has standing, current export
regulations do not violate the consumer's reasonable expectation of
privacy.
The Fourth Amendment doctrine has evolved as this country's tech-
nological developments have advanced. After the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Boyd i'. U.S.,t29 a search was considered unreasonable if the
government's regulations intruded on an individual's private property
rights without establishing a superior right vested in the property by the
government. Utility, necessity, and significant public interest arguments
by the government could not trump a citizen's property rights.
However, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the
Fourth Amendment away from property rights in response to law en-
forcement's increased use of intrusive investigative techniques, such as
wiretaps. The Court instead defined the limits of "search and seizure" in
terms of whether the defendant displayed a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy and, in addition, whether the expectation was one society regarded
as reasonable.1311 Search and seizure by the government was reasonable
only if the government had probable cause and took the procedural step
of obtaining a warrant. 131
The Supreme Court again modified the Fourth Amendment doctrine
in Terry v. Ohio by adopting a sliding-scale approach to measuring the
reasonableness of a search and seizure. 32 Under this approach, the gov-
emnment is permitted to conduct a search and seizure based on a showing
of reasonable suspicion. 33 The Court justified its departure from the
probable cause requirement by accepting the government's argument that
a limited search and seizure, such as in a stop and frisk, 34 is absolutely
129 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
130 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that government's act of
electronically listening to and recording defendant's words spoken into telephone receiver in
public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which defendant justifiably relied while us-
ing the telephone booth).
131 See id.
132 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
133 Id. at 27.
134 A stop and frisk is a situation where law enforcement officers who are suspicious of an
individual run their hands lightly over the suspect's outer garments to determine if the person
is carrying a concealed weapon. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1420 (6" ed. 1990). Also called a
"pat down" or "threshold inquiry," a stop and frisk is intended to stop short of any activity that
could be considered a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The scope of the search
must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the
stop. TerrY, 392 U.S. at 18.
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necessary for law enforcement. 135 The Terry approach to the Fourth
Amendment has subsequently been expanded and applied to situations
outside stop and frisk.136
Even if one were to assume that the end-user of the exported
software has standing to bring a constitutionally-based suit against the
United States, it would make little sense to apply the Terry analysis to
encryption export regulations. The Fourth Amendment protects an indi-
vidual's privacy from affirmative intrusions by the government, gener-
ally in the context of law enforcement activities. 37 The effect of an
invasion upon a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy is exclusion
of the tainted evidence. 13x The exclusionary rule is intended to force law
enforcement to disgorge evidence it has unlawfully obtained. In the con-
text of crypto, protection of a consumer's Fourth Amendment privacy
interest does not mandate in favor of wide dissemination of encryption
technology since the consumer's Fourth Amendment privacy interest is
not implicated until the government has affirmatively breached her rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. Thus, even if the end-user or consumer
of exported encryption has standing, refusing to allow exports of encryp-
tion technology does not constitute an invasion of this individual's ex-
pectation of privacy that would trigger Fourth Amendment analysis.
V. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
A. THE DILEMMA OF UNBREAKABLE ENCRYPTION
While the national security and law enforcement communities ac-
knowledge that encryption has beneficial and legitimate uses, they are
concerned "about the serious threat posed by the proliferation and use of
robust encryption products that do not allow for the immediate, lawful
access to the plaintext of encrypted, criminally-related communications
and electronically stored data in accordance with strict legal require-
ments and procedures."'' 39 The rationale for the limits imposed by the
Commerce Department on the export of strong encryption products is
that such products might be used by hostile nationals or terrorists to hide
135 See Tern ', 392 U.S. at 20.
136 Dena Klopfenstein, Comment, Deciphering the Encn,ption Debate: A Constitutional
Analysis of Current Regulations and a Prediction for the Future, 48 EMORY L.J. 765, 801
(1999); see, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980) (holding that persons
suspected of carrying drugs could be stopped at the airport based only upon reasonable
suspicion).
137 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that a radio transmitter
concealed on an informant to record and monitor conversations with defendant, without war-
rant, at defendant's home violated defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
138 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (articulating the exclusionary rule).
139 FBI REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
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their communications from U.S. intelligence agencies. 141 According to
the FBI, "law enforcement continues to experience an increase in the
number of encounters with, and the subsequent damaging and detrimen-
tal effects of, the use of commercially-available encryption by criminals,
terrorists and in hostile intelligence activities throughout the United
States and across international borders."' 4 1
The Clinton administration asserted that "[tjimely action against ter-
rorists, drug dealers, or kidnappers may require rapid access to electronic
information that must not be thwarted by encryption."' 142 Rather than
taking on the unnecessary and impossible task of eradicating strong
crypto, the government has made it its objective to "prevent unbreakable
encryption form becoming routine."'' 4 3 In a world where unbreakable
encryption is commonplace, "[a]ll communications on the information
highway would be immune from lawful interception. In a world
threatened by international organized crime, terrorism, and rogue govern-
ments, this would be folly.' 44
According to Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI, the potential ad-
verse impact on public safety and national security resulting from a "wait
and see" approach is "too great to justify catering to the narrow interest
of computer software companies."' 45
Even reducing the decoding time to days or weeks may not be suffi-
cient to prevent the types of crime the export policy targets. Legally
authorized wiretaps generally provide crucial information just before a
crime is to occur; similarly, a nearly instantaneous ability to decode
messages is necessary to prevent crimes on the Internet. Effective law
enforcement depends on electronic surveillance and search and
seizure. 146
14 See generallv id.
141 FBI REPORT, supra note I, at 6 (The Aldrich Ames and Ramzi Yousef cases are often
cited to illustrate use of encryption technology by criminals to conceal their activity.); see
White, supra note 6, at 198. In the Aldrich Ames spy case, "Ames was told by his Soviet
handlers to encrypt computer file information to be passed to them." FBI REPORT, supra note
I, at 5. Similarly, Ramzi Yousef's terrorist plan to blow up eleven U.S. owned airlines in the
Far East was found in encrypted computer files in Manila after his arrest. Id. Incidentally,
Yousef was also the mastermind behind the bombing of the World Trade Center. Id.
142 CESA, supra note 35, at I.
143 Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 43.
144 Dorothy E. Denning, The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime, NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 1994, at
35. Denning is a Georgetown University computer scientist who regularly contributes to the
encryption debate.
145 The Encrviption Debate: Criminals, Terrorists, and the Security Needs of Business and
Industrv: Hearing Befiwe the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciar, 105'h Cong. 43-46 (1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
146 Dinh, supra note 33, at 392-93.
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The traditional line between "law enforcement" and the "intelli-
gence community" has been blurred since the end of the Cold War.' 47
The ability of the NSA, the primary agency charged with the collection
of foreign signals intelligence, to intercept and exploit such signals is
fundamental and necessary to U.S. security.1 4x The inability to decrypt
scrambled communications would greatly diminish the value of the
NSA's signals intelligence activities. 49
Cryptology is crucial for the intelligence community's ability to
meet the arising challenges in the post-Cold War world, which includes
"the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narcotics-
trafficking, and economic competitiveness."'' 51 U.S. intelligence activi-
ties, through and including the Persian Gulf War, provide numerous in-
stances in which the intelligence community's cryptanalytic skills proved
crucial to the success of U.S. military operations.' 5' Nevertheless, there
are those who completely oppose any form of U.S. intelligence opera-
tions, even at the cost of national security. For example, a group refer-
ring to themselves as techno-anarchists advocates "a Brave New World
in which governments disintegrate and individuals from the nucleus of
society .... -152 Techno-anarchists believe that unbreakable encryption
will empower individuals by making it "impossible for governments to
control information, compile dossiers, conduct wiretaps, regulate eco-
nomic arrangements, and even collect taxes."' 153 Interestingly, the leader
of this techno-anarchist movement, Timothy May, both acknowledges
and embraces the potential danger of widespread availability of unbreak-
able crypto. 154
B. DOES THE PROLIFERATION OF STRONG ENCRYPTION ADVANCE
NATIONAL SECURITY iNTERESTS?
Some scholars fear that widespread use of unbreakable encryption
will have the effect of converting computers and telecommunications
systems into "safe havens for criminal activity . . . [providing] a means
for tax evasion, money laundering, espionage, contract killings, and im-
plementation of data havens for storing and marketing illegal or contro-
versial material."'' 55 Americans for Computer Privacy, on the other
hand, argues that any U.S. export restrictions will be detrimental to both
147 See Stender, supra note 5 at 326.
148 See id. at 327.
149 Id. at 328.
150 Id.
151 See id. at 328.
152 ld. at 334.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 334-35.
155 Id.
2000]
182 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:161
the national security interests and businesses of the United States.' 56
There seem to be two competing approaches to looking at the connection
between encryption and export controls: (I) that wide availability and
implementation of strong encryption technology will provide a better
way to protect highly confidential information, 157 and (2) that restriction
of the availability of strong encryption will render it more difficult for
dangerous individuals and groups to conceal activities which pose a seri-
ous threat to national security.'15
With regard to the first approach, while worldwide availability of
U.S. encryption products may help protect U.S. businesses and industries
from computer crime, fraud, and theft, it is disingenuous to claim that
U.S. national security interests will also be advanced by proliferating the
global market with our more advanced encryption products unless every-
body in the world, including criminals, terrorists, and other people with
hostile agendas, agreed to store their encryption keys with a trusted third
party or similar entity within a key recovery system. This scenario
seems highly improbable in light of the fact that no global infrastructure
exists to support key recovery. 59 In fact, many countries have already
decided not to participate in the key recovery system. 1611 Moreover, the
ACP itself adamantly opposes any sort of mandatory key recovery
system. 161
The second approach, which asserts that restriction of the availabil-
ity of strong encryption will make it harder for dangerous individuals to
conceal their activities, will not be favorable to U.S. high-tech companies
which hope to obtain their share of the millions of dollars that analysts
predict will be made in the global encryption market.' 62 This approach
may help the national security cause at least with regard to U.S. strong
encryption technology, because those with hostile agendas will have to
work a little harder to acquire and implement strong encryption. The
effectiveness of this approach will largely depend on availability of
strong encryption from non-U.S. sources. If there is wide availability of
such technology from foreign sources, then restrictions on the export of
U.S. encryption technology may only marginally advance national secur-
ity interests.
1-56 See generally ACP, supra note 3.
157 See id.
158 See FBI REPORT, supra note I, at 1-2.
159 See ACP, supra note 3 (stating that "despite the Administration's best efforts over the
years, not one bilateral or multilateral agreement has been reached regarding the global ex-
change of encryption keys").
16o See id.
161 See generally id.
162 See infla Part VII.B.
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Even when one takes into consideration the fact that "a significant
number of encryption programs are already available from non-U.S.
sources worldwide, and in many cases obtained quite cheaply and easily,
it would appear not to be in the best interests of the United States, as a
pure security matter, to contribute to the proliferation of encryption."'' 63
This situation is consistent with the U.S. policy of restricting the export
of other military-related technology, such as Patriot Missile Technology,
available from foreign sources. 164 The United States does not allow the
unbridled export of sophisticated missile technology, which obviously
poses a threat to national security, merely because China and Russia have
similar systems available.165
VI. ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERALIZING ENCRYPTION
EXPORT REGULATIONS
A. INFEASIBILITY OF RESTRICTING EXPORT OF ENCRYPTION
SOFTWARE AND GOODS
As the government suggests, the widespread availability of strong
encryption technology to terrorist organizations or unfriendly foreign
countries could compromise national security interests. However, limit-
ing foreign availability of U.S. encryption technology is not the most
effective way to protect our national security when one considers the fact
that such technology is readily available from other countries. At a hear-
ing on U.S. counter-terrorism policy before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Senator Sam Nunn stated that the U.S. cannot "limit the power of
encryption successfully over the long term. That's like trying to limit
technology. I do not think it can be done."'' 66
Senator Nunn was right. For one, state-of-the-art, non-key recovery
encryption is freely available from non-American multinational corpora-
tions like Siemens and Brokart. 167 Some foreign companies, prior to the
January 2000 amendments to the EAR, have marketed their unrestricted
163 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, O.T.A.-ISS-596, U.S. CONG., EXPORT CONTROLS AND
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 56 (1994) (noting that arguing for decontrol of exports because
they can be found elsewhere is analogous to allowing uncontrolled gun sales to criminals
simply because they can get them anyway).
164 See also Stender, supra note 5, at 322, 337 (Export controls have the effect of limiting
the availability of U.S. crypto, much like export controls which "limit the availability of Pa-
triot Missile technology despite similar systems being available to one degree or another
worldwide.").
165 See id. Because strong encryption can easily be applied in a manner which harms our
national security, it can arguably still be considered a potential munition, sometimes referred
to as a dual-use item. Making potential foreign criminals and terrorists "work harder" to get
this potential munition could be seen as advancing national security interests.
166 U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate .ludiciaryv Committee, Fed-
eral News Service, Sept. 3, 1998.
167 See ACP, supra note 3; see also Andrews, supra note 38, at DI.
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products as "stronger security than any U.S. company can provide.' 16
In addition, the mathematical algorithms and formulas which provide the
basis and foundation for advanced encryption technology are readily
available over the Internet.' 69 Critics of the earlier and more restrictive
encryption export regulations have pointed out that it makes little sense
to restrict the export of this technology when the encryption genie is
already out of the bottle. 711
In addition, some U.S. companies have worked around U.S. encryp-
tion policies by forming foreign ventures, allowing them to develop,
manufacture, and export strong encryption technology without regard to
U.S. export policies.'71 Additionally, there are various ways of illegally
distributing U.S. encryption technology. For example, there is a personal
use exemption that "allows U.S. citizens and permanents residents to
travel abroad with encryption hardware and software."' 1 2 While there
are guidelines for travel with such equipment, there are no definitive
means for determining if a product is illegally exported or not. 173 Addi-
tionally, modems allow for the illegal transmission of encryption
software to parties in foreign countries. 174 The EAR itself permit en-
cryption software to be placed on internet sites within the U.S. as long as
the provider implements safeguards that are "adequate to prevent unau-
thorized transfer of such code outside of the United States."' 175 These
safeguards, however, will ultimately fail to keep encryption products
away from foreigners because a "foreign person who has signed up for
Internet access using a U.S. Internet Service Provider ('ISP') and who
signed into the secure download site either from the United States or who
paid long distance charges to dial-in to a U.S. ISP from an overseas loca-
tion" would have access to this encryption software. 176
Thus, critics of export controls point out that while the goal of en-
cryption export regulations is to preserve national security, the "global
availability of strong encryption software through foreign developers and
the Internet will continue to thwart that goal, severely damaging the U.S.
168 Andrews, supra note 38, at DI.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 Dan Goodwin, True Tales from the Encrypt, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 2.
172 White, supra note 6, at 202.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 E. Franklin Haignere, Comment, An Overview of the Issues SurroulndiIg the Encrp-
tion Exportation Debate, Their Ramifications, and Potential Resolution, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 319, 327 (citing 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii) (1999)).
176 I.
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software industry at the same time."' 7 7 Moreover, any individual en-
gaged in serious criminal or terrorist activity who thinks that cryptogra-
phy would further that activity is unlikely to be deterred from using
homemade or underground products.
B. POTENTIAL ADVERSE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESTRICTIVE
ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS
At a hearing of the 10 5 th Congress in 1997 on the Security and Free-
dom Through Encryption Act ("SAFE"), William A. Reinsch, Undersec-
retary of Commerce for Export Administration, stated that "no empirical
evidence supported the assertion that American firms are suffering grave
losses because other countries do not restrict the export of encryption
software."' 178 Critics of the U.S. encryption export policies, past and pre-
sent, however, point out that these policies, rather than having the in-
tended effect of slowing down the spread of powerful encryption
technology, created "a bonanza for alert entrepreneurs outside the United
States" who carved out booming business by selling powerful encryption
technology around the world that the U.S. government prohibited Ameri-
can companies from exporting.' 79
In 1997, software industry analysts estimated that U.S. encryption
export policies placed domestic companies at risk of losing $60 billion in
the global software market because competing international software
companies had the opportunity to export much stronger encryption tech-
nology.I"" According to a 1999 report issued by the Economic Strategies
Institute ("ESI"), "the U.S. economy could lose $97 billion over the next
five years as a result of continued export controls on cryptographic prod-
ucts."'' ESI's report also warned that American companies could lose
an additional $140 billion in sales, because foreign consumers would be
deterred from buying U.S. encryption products under the fear that the
confidentiality of their e-mails and phone calls could be compromised by
U.S. intelligence services. 182
177 Levin, supra note 63, at 544; see also Stender, supra note 5, at 320-21 (stating that
"criminals and spies have plenty of crypto available worldwide, and therefore there is simply
no need to restrict U.S.-built crypto").
178 The Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695
Befie the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 105' Cong. 56 (1997).
179 See id.
181 See Andrews, supra note 38, at DI (reporting that Brokart Information Systems, a
German software company, has profited by selling strong encryption software to companies
like America Online, Netscape Communications, and Microsoft, because U.S. export regula-
tions do not allow American companies to export powerful encryption technology).
181 McNulty, supra note 66, at 444 n. 112 (citing Eric R. Olbeter, Encryp tion and Securit,,
J. or COM., Aug. 6, 1998, at 7A).
182 See id. at 444 n.113.
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U.S. encryption export regulations have forced many U.S. compa-
nies to incur the costs of restructuring their computer software develop-
ment departments, namely to develop multiple versions of their software
- both a domestic version and an exportable version with weaker encryp-
tion. 183 Consequently, these companies had three alternatives in export-
ing computer software that uses encryption technology; they could: (1)
export weaker versions of their software, (2) enforce an encryption key
escrow system, or (3) develop alliances with foreign companies and pro-
duce encryption goods overseas.'8 4 Another way in which encryption
export policy has cost the U.S. economy is the fact that U.S. software
companies are forced to alter their production and marketing depart-
ments. For example, Netscape Communications must continually moni-
tor its web site in order to prevent foreign users from downloading the
"domestic", 128-bit version of its browser software. 185 In June 1998,
several chief executive officers of the leading American computer firms
formed the Business Software Alliance, which issued a report entitled
"The Cost of Government-Driven Key Escrow Encryption."' 186 This re-
port concluded that "government plans to institute a federal key recov-
ery/escrow infrastructure, designed to give law enforcement and
intelligence agencies access to encrypted materials, would cost as much
as $7.7 billion a year."' 87
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. FUNDING OF A CENTRALIZED COUNTER-ENCRYPTION RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT THROUGH TAXATION OF
ENCRYPTION EXPORTS
Any type of proposed solution to the encryption export debate will
require a balanced approach that takes into consideration public safety
and national security concerns while not unduly hindering the ability of
the U.S. high-tech industry to compete in the global encryption products
market. To this end, this note proposes that the U.S. government con-
tinue with its trend of easing encryption export restrictions, and in the
place of licensing restrictions introduce a less burdensome "encryption
183 See Jeffrey H. Matsuura & George B. Delta, Export Controls oil the Internet, J. PRO-
PRIETARY RTS., Mar. 1998, at 2, 11.
184 Levin, supra note 63, at 543 (citing James J. Carter, Comment, The Devil and Daniel
Bernstein: Constitutional Flaws and Practical Fallacies in the Encryption Export Controls, 76
OR. L. REV. 981 (1997)).
185 See John Simons & David Bank, Restrictions are Relaxed on Encrption Exports,
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 17, 1998, at A3.
186 See McNulty, supra note 66, at 433. Member companies of the Business Software
Alliance include Microsoft, Novell, Adobe, Bentley Systems, FileMaker, Lotus Development,
Sybase, and Symantec. See id.
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export tax" which would be used to fund the research and development
of advanced decryption or counter-encryption"I methods and tools by a
centralized and joint effort of law enforcement and intelligence
communities.
One compelling reason for such a proposal is the fact that licensing
restrictions are not an effective way of ensuring our national security and
cannot be a substitute for developing the technology and tools needed by
law enforcement and the NSA officials to decrypt and obtain access to
the plaintext information crucial to their respective functions. One way
to ensure the national security of the United States in the digital informa-
tion age is for the government to stay abreast of and in the forefront of
the latest encryption technology. Controls on technology, regardless of
how they are structured or enforced, cannot substitute for continuing
technological advances by the United States. 189
Governmental investment in the research and development in the
area of cryptography may be the most feasible and reliable way to assist
law enforcement and intelligence groups, and thus protect our national
security interests, according to a report by the National Research Council
("NRC"). 1911 NRC's report suggests "that a technical center should be
established to aid federal, state, and local officials burdened with the task
of solving highly sophisticated technological problems."' 9 1 The Clinton
Administration has itself expressed support for "the creation of a central-
ized law enforcement resource within the FBI to provide law enforce-
ment with urgently needed technical capabilities to fulfill its proliferation
and use of strong, commercially-available encryption products .... ,,192
The FBI currently has a Computer Analysis and Response Team
("CART"), which "is responsible for providing assistance in law enforce-
ment investigations where computer generated and/or electronically
stored information has been obtained pursuant to court authorized search
and seizure."'193 The CART has witnessed "the number of cases utilizing
encryption and/or password protection increase from two percent to ap-
proximately twenty percent over the past four years, to include the use of
188 From a theoretical standpoint, there appear to be two main ways of obtaining access to
the plaintext of an encrypted message. The first approach would be a "brut-force" method of
using an algorithm to try all the logically possible combinations until the encryption code is
cracked. The second approach would be a "back door" method, which allows a person with
knowledge of how the encryption program operates to somehow break into and manipulate the
program itself to decipher the encrypted message.
189 See THEODORE J. ECKERT, THE TRANSFER OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUN-
TRIES: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL POLICY AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (1981).
190 See White, supra note 6, at 203 n.178.
191 Id. at 203 n.178.
192 FBI REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
193 Id.
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56-bit Data Encryption Standard and 128-bit Pretty Good Privacy en-
cryption."' 194 Even more,
[t]hese totals are expected to increase significantly with
the introduction of Microsoft's newest operating system,
Windows 2000. This new operating system will allow
users to employ an Encrypted File System ("EFS")
which will provide the individual computer users with
easy to use 'point and click' encryption thereby enabling
the user, including criminals and terrorists, to easily en-
crypt all of the files stored on their computer. 95
Some have pointed out that "[w]hile the NRC is very ambitious in
its recommendation that the government direct its resources to the devel-
opment of advanced counter-encryption technologies, that stance does
not solve the government's need to protect national security interests to-
day."' 96 Even these critics, however, do not deny that it is important for
law enforcement to develop the ability to descramble strong encryption
codes. Rather, these critics point out that law enforcement currently
lacks the ability to decipher information encoded with strong encryption,
and thus argue that government officials should have some means of
cracking encrypted information in legitimate law enforcement con-
texts. 197 As we move into the Information Age in the twenty-first cen-
tury, it will be critical for us to ensure that law enforcement and
intelligence officials have the tools and know-how to effectively carry
out their respective functions.198
194 Id. at 7. Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP") has "become the program of choice among
longtime Internet users and technical wizards." Lisa Guernsey, Secrecyfir All, as Encrption
Goes to Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at GI.
195 FBI REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8.
196 Dinh, supra note 33, at 397 (1998). Dinh argues that while an encryption export pol-
icy requiring U.S. software vendors to provide the government with decryption keys or com-
mit to providing such keys in the future may not be ideal, "no alternative achieves a better
balance of interest in privacy, economic growth, and national security." d. at 375. The NRC,
however, flatly rejects a key management system as untested and instead emphasizes govern-
mental investment in advanced counter-encryption technologies. The NRC is particularly con-
cerned with the "uncertainty of market response to the aggressive promotion of escrow
procedures." Id. at 392.
197 See id. at 392-393. According to ACP, "Iflor today's commercially sold encryption
products, [namely 128-bit encryption], the technology does not exist to provide immediate
access to communication without the knowledge of the user." ACP, supra note 3. This would
be like the "FBI mandating compact disk quality sound recording in the days of the 45-RPM
record." Id.
198 See Stender, supra note 5, at 320 (Law enforcement and national security intelligence
argue that unbridled proliferation of strong encryption to criminals, terrorists, and foreign in-
telligence targets of interest will seriously undermine the government's ability to protect the
security of state and its citizens.).
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A large part of the purported detrimental effects to the computer and
software industry that result from restrictions on encryption exports ap-
pears to be the loss of global market share. 199 These industries fear that
they will lose their dominance in world markets "if offshore developers
incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. in-
dustry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to re-
quirements for export licenses because of strict controls of export of
cryptography.1 21 111 Prior to the January 2000 changes to U.S. export regu-
lations, which lifted the limit on the strength of encryption exports, a
reason for the imposition of a marginal encryption export tax in place of
a burdensome encryption export licensing scheme might have been to
avoid hamstringing U.S. high-tech companies from effectively compet-
ing in the global market, especially in light of the fact that non-American
companies are not subject to encryption export restrictions.
Current U.S. encryption export regulations, however, are much less
restrictive and friendlier to U.S. companies who want to ship their en-
cryption products overseas. Still there are other policy reasons for im-
posing an encryption export tax. As stated earlier, the ability of the U.S.
to stay abreast of the latest encryption is critical to the national security
of our country in the digital information age. Funding for this endeavor
has to come from somewhere. Who should pay for this? From a fairness
standpoint, it seems that companies and individuals that stand to profit by
exporting the strongest encryption products should have to contribute the
most to counter-encryption research and development funds. Otherwise,
exporters of encryption impose a negative externality 2° I upon other U.S.
citizens and corporations who do not export similar technology to foreign
end-users.
The profit-driven activities of U.S. encryption exporters are likely to
create new costs because law enforcement and intelligence agencies are
placed in a situation in which they will have to invest more time and
money in developing counter-encryption technologies. This type of situ-
ation might be characterized as a "commons dilemma" in that (I) we
have a resource, namely national security, which is shared by multiple
parties, and (2) those parties who compromise or "use up" this resource,
namely exporters of encryption technology, do not absorb all of the costs
of their activities. 2112 The effect of such a situation is to encourage en-
cryption exporters to over-utilize the U.S.'s national security re-
199 See McNulty, supra note 66, at 443-44.
20 Stender, supra note 5, at 321.
201 See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY,
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 7 (4 th ed. 1998).
202 See generally JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI, MATERIAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 87
(2000).
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sources. 2113 As this note proposes, one way to counter the profit-
motivated incentive to over-utilize national security interests is to impose
an encryption export tax. In summary, the rationale for imposing such a
tax is two-fold: (1) the U.S. government will have to allocate a portion of
its research and development funds toward counter-encryption technol-
ogy in order to provide adequate national security in the digital informa-
tion age; and (2) the negative externality costs associated with exporting
encryption technology can be reduced by imposing a tax on U.S. distrib-
utors who plan to profit by exporting strong encryption technology.
Of course, any sort of encryption export tax should not be so bur-
densome that it drives U.S. companies out of the encryption industry or
disrupts the financial stability of U.S. companies who decide to compete
in the global encryption market. Imposition of a new tax in any given
industry or market brings with it the possibility that some of the smaller
competitors will be driven out of the market because they lack the finan-
cial resources to effectively compete with the bigger companies. 2 14 This
scenario is not unique to the encryption market, and may be an associ-
ated cost that the U.S. must bear in implementing a more liberalized ex-
port policy. However, because the U.S. software companies control
seventy-five percent of the global software market share, it is plausible
that the U.S. software industry, unlike its foreign competitors, will be
able to absorb the additional costs associated with an encryption export
tax. 205
Inevitably, privacy advocates, such as the Americans for Computer
Privacy, would balk at the suggestion of supporting any type of govern-
mental effort to develop counter-encryption devices and tools. Groups
like the ACP would likely argue that such counter-encryption efforts
could create the means for Big Brother 206 to monitor all private commu-
nications. Putting aside the issue of whether governmental counter-en-
cryption efforts will transform our society into Orwell's futuristic
nightmare, suffice it to say that the U.S. government will most likely
invest in the development of counter-encryption technology, as will the
private sector. By imposing an encryption export tax, the government
would make sure that companies that stand to profit by exporting encryp-
203 See id. at 89 (The underlying feature of the commons dilemma is that the parties in a
position to use up a resource do not bear all of the costs of using up the resource.).
204 The advancement of technology and new communications mediums through which
companies can carry out their business transactions, such as the World Wide Web, may ulti-
mately change the dynamics of competition between larger and smaller companies in a given
market. For example, it is possible that the lower overhead costs of operating a web-based
business may allow smaller, leaner companies to out savvy larger, sluggish competitors.
205 See McNulty, supra note 66, at 781.
206 See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1" ed.) (1949).
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tion software and devices contribute their fair and proportionate share
into the U.S. counter-encryption development fund.
B. How WOULD THE PROPOSED TAX OPERATE?
The proposed encryption export tax would operate on a sliding scale
and vary depending on the strength of encryption incorporated into the
exported product. For example, the tax rate would be higher for 512-bit
than for 128-bit encryption technology. The rationale for this sliding
scale is that stronger encryption exports create a greater negative exter-
nality in terms of national security. The proposed tax would not vary
depending on which countries received the encryption products. 2 17 , Va-
rying the tax in this manner could have the effect of straining trade rela-
tions among countries or creating a scenario in which U.S. distributors
export their goods to a country with a relatively lower tax rate only to
have a distributor in that foreign country send their goods to end-users in
other foreign countries, thereby circumventing higher export taxes. The
specifics on what the tax rate should be for a given encryption strength is
best left for the Department of Commerce to decide, since they are the
best position to determine the tax rates which would best serve the goal
of preventing the national security "commons dilemma" while not being
overly burdensome on U.S. companies. Factors which the DOC should
consider in determining tax rates include, but are not limited to, the
strength of encryption and the availability of similar products from for-
eign distributors.
C. WHICH AGENCIES WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING THE
FUND? WHERE WOULD THE FUNDS GO, AND How WOULD
THEY BE USED?
Under the proposed system, the DOC, which is currently responsi-
ble for regulating the export of all non-military use encryption de-
vices, 2° 8 would be the agency in charge of taxing U.S. distributors who
wish to export encryption goods. There are a couple of different ways in
which the DOC could carry out this function. DOC officials could con-
duct on-site visits and inspections for some of the larger companies wish-
ing to export their encryption devices. Alternatively, the DOC could set
up regional centers where smaller business operators could travel to un-
dergo a review of the amount, types, and strength of encryption devices
they want to export. The DOC could also require that all encryption
exports go through its own customs officials for inspection and review of
207 The proposed tax would not alter the current EAR's prohibition on encryption exports
to countries on the State Department's list of terrorist supporting countries. See Encryption
Items, supra note 41, at 2492.
208 See supra text accompanying note 24.
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the amount and strength of encryption goods sought to be exported. Be-
cause it is difficult to say which approach would be the most effective
and efficient from an administrative standpoint, it would be best to defer
to the DOC's decision on how to enforce and collect the encryption ex-
port tax.
The funds collected from this encryption export tax would ulti-
mately go from the DOC to a centralized technical agency whose task it
would be to develop advanced counter-encryption technologies and
tools, 2°19 which would in turn be used to assist the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies burdened with having to overcome highly sophisti-
cated technological problems. 210 This note proposes that the government
establish such a centralized technical agency, as the NRC has suggested,
or that the FBI's CART and the NSA merge their efforts in developing
counter-encryption technology. Revenue from the encryption tax would
go directly from the DOC to the government's research and development
fund. Alternatively, this revenue could take an indirect route by going
from the DOC to the Department of Treasury, and from there to the gov-
ernment's counter-encryption research and development fund. This sec-
ond approach might assist the Treasury Department in carrying out its
function of collecting federal income taxes through the Internal Revenue
Service. Once again, it would be best to defer to the DOC's judgment as
to which procedures to implement in carrying out its function of collect-
ing and distributing funds for the research and development of counter-
encryption technology.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The justification and means for implementing governmental regula-
tion of exportation of encryption technology should carefully weigh the
policy interests advanced by all interested parties. The policies advanced
by various groups, namely (1) U.S. high-tech industry advocates, (2) pri-
vacy advocates, and (3) national security advocates, in this debate are
numerous and compelling. At the end of the day, however, the constitu-
tionally based arguments for repealing current encryption export regula-
tions, advanced primarily by privacy and some industry advocates are
not persuasive. Instead, there are strong economic incentives for easing
export regulation, as there are equally compelling national security rea-
sons for maintaining some level of regulation. It would be difficult for
anybody to argue that the extra profits to be reaped by certain companies
and individuals in the encryption software industry outweigh the security
of our nation as a whole.
209 See supra text accompanying note 188.
210 See supra Part VIII.A.
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What is needed is a balanced approach to encryption export regula-
tion which will best ensure our national security interests while not being
overly burdensome on U.S. companies who wish to compete in the
global encryption market. As stated previously, this note proposes that
the U.S. government, in place of regulating through licensing restric-
tions, introduce a nominal "encryption export tax" which would be used
to fund a joint and centralized effort by the FBI and NSA to research and
develop advanced decryption technologies and tools. The proposed tax
would make sure that the companies and individuals who stand to profit
by exporting strong encryption products contribute their fair and propor-
tionate share to the governmental counter-encryption research and devel-
opment funds, which will in turn provide the tools needed to ensure our
national security in the digital information age.

